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By Kurt H. Decker*
I. Introduction
Public sector labor law is still in an early stage of evolutionary
development, influenced and limited by state or local statutes, execu-
tive orders, and attorney general opinions that vary from one state to
another.' Although state courts and legislatures are still grappling
with basic aspects of unionization-recognition, certification, scope
of bargaining, and impasse resolution-attention is also being fo-
cused on the relationship between employee and union; namely, the
duty of fair representation.
The union's duty to fairly represent employees is an aspect of
the union's power to act on behalf of and in the interest of employees
regarding terms and conditions of employment.2 This article exam-
* B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt
University; Former Ass't Att'y General, Pa. Governor's Office, Bureau of Labor Relations;
Associate, Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pa.; Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
I. At least forty-five states provide some form of collective bargaining for either all or a
portion of their public employees. 51 GoV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501 el seq. 1978)
2. This subject has been popular among legal writers. See THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRE-
SENTATION I (McKelvey ed. 1977); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151
(1957); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663
(1973); Fowks, The Duly of Fair Representation. Arbitrary or Perfunctory Handling of Employee
Grievances, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1976); Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limi-
tation on Union Control of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1036 (1970); Lewis, Fair
Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 81 (1967); Sum-
mers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement What Constitutes Fair
Representation?), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1962); Tobias, A Pleafor the Wrongful
Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 55 (1972); Comment,
Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation. A Plea for
Pre-emption, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 593 (1965); Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral
A wards: A Modelfor Protecting Individual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 1310 (1977); Note, Statute of Limitations Governing Fair Representation
Action Against Union When Brought with Section 301 Action Against Employer, 44 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 418 (1976).
ines the public sector union's duty to fairly represent employees
under Pennsylvania's public employee bargaining statutes.
The fair representation duty will be examined from varying per-
spectives. Because of the relatively undeveloped Pennsylvania au-
thority in this area, standards developed by the federal courts and
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) will be considered.
The well-defined federal private sector labor law provides a useful
starting point for analysis.3 Nevertheless, the unique nature of the
public sector must be borne in mind.' Although an examination of
the duty of fair representation in the private sector is necessary
before considering the representation standard to which public sec-
tor unions may be held accountable, private sector labor law does
not and cannot provide a "monolithic model"5 for Pennsylvania's
public sector.
II. The Duty of Fair Representation in the Private Sector
A. The Jurisdictional Basis of the Duty
Section 159(a) of the National Labor Relations Act6 establishes
that the union is the exclusive representative for all employees within
the bargaining unit, not just those voting for that particular labor
organization. Collective bargaining is based on subordinating indi-
vidual employee interests to the collective interests of all bargaining
unit members. For example, federal labor law vests the union with
broad authority to negotiate and administer collective bargaining
3. Private sector precedents provide analogous authority to public sector tribunals when
the statutory language in the state statute parallels a federal statute. See, e.g., Fire Fighters
Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974);
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); Kerrigan
v. City of Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 278 N.E.2d 387 (1972); Drachman & Ambash, Is Looking Up
Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public Sector Labor Relations?-A Man-
agement Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDuc. 209 (1977); Kahn, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other
Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public Sector Labor Relations?-The Perspective of a Neutral, 6 J.L.
& EDUC. 221 (1977).
The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, for example, provides that the Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Board "shall follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended." 44 CAL. STAT. ANN. § 1148 (West Supp. 1978).
4. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated,
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the experience gained in the private
sector is of no value here, rather we are stressing that analogies have limited applica-
tion and the experience gained in the private employment sector will not necessarily
provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employment.
Id. at 500, 337 A.2d at 264-65. See also Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa.
521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975); PLRB v. AFSCME, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 348 A.2d 921 (1975).
5. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 500, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment ....
agreements while prohibiting individual employee bargaining.8 This
broad and pervasive statutory authority favoring unions is not ex-
plicitly countered by any statutory protections for individual em-
ployee rights. The courts recognized that these statutes left the
employee without recourse against unfair union representation and
filled the void by interpreting them to imply a fair representation
duty.
The jurisdictional basis for fair representation litigation derives
primarily from Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 (LMRA).9 It permits suits against employers for breaches of
collective bargaining agreements without regard to diversity of citi-
zenship. Additionally, an employee's union can be joined when it
breaches a fair representation duty in processing a grievance."0
A parallel administrative remedy was recognized by the NLRB
in Miranda Fuel Co. " The Board ruled that unfair representation
falls within the prohibitions of Section 157 of the NLRA. t2 Accord-
ing to the Board, Section 157 "gives employees the right to be free
from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive
bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment."' 3  Because
Section 158(b)(1)(a) of the NLRA makes a Section 157 violation an
8. Id. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This section provides in pertinent part,
Venue, amount, and citizenship.
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Responsibilityfor acts ofagent; entityfor purposes of suit; enforcement 0/ money judg-
ments.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforcea-
ble against any individual member or his assets.
10. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S.
195 (1962).
11. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). The Second Circuit denied enforcement without a majority opinion regarding whether
a violation of the duty constituted an unfair labor practice.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides,
Right oemployees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
13. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
unfair labor practice, Miranda made unfair representation by the
union an unfair labor practice.' 4 The Board also held that a Section
158(b)(2)"5 violation occurred and stated that employer acquiescence
in the union's conduct could violate Sections 158(a)(1) and
158(a)(3). 6 Subsequently, in Independent Metal Workers Union
Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.)7 the Board ruled that a union's failure to
process an employee's grievance because of race violated Sections
158(b)(1)(a), 158(b)(2), and 158(b)(3).' 8
Consequently, an aggrieved employee may seek a remedy for
unfair representation through an administrative proceeding before
the NLRB, or through a suit in state or federal court. In either situa-
tion, the source of the remedy is not protective legislation, but rather
judicial recognition of the need for some protection of individual
rights within the collective bargaining system.
B. The Source of the Duty
The fair representation duty was first established by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases arising under the Railway Labor
Act (RLA). 19 Subsequently, the duty was also applied to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 ° The leading case was Steele v.
14. Id. Section 158(b)(l)(A) provides it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein .. " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)) (I)(a) (1976).
15. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Section 158(b)(2) provides it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or termi-
nated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
16. Sections 158(a)(1) and (3) provide in pertinent part that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer:
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title . . . . [§ 157]:
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
17. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
18. Id. Section 158 (b)(3) provides it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a). 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1976).
19. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976). Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v.
Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 338 U.S.232 (1949); Tunstall v. Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S.
210 (1944).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892
(1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,2' a suit by a Black railroad fireman
to set aside a seniority agreement negotiated by the union that dis-
criminated against Blacks. The Court approached the problem by
indicating that if the RLA conferred exclusive bargaining authority
on a union "without any commensurate statutory duty toward its
members, constitutional questions arise. For the representative is
clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to
constitutional limitations .... *22 The Court avoided these consti-
tutional difficulties by finding that the Act implicitly "expresses the
aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft
or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred
upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile dis-
crimination against them. "23
Steele represents the initial attempt in labor law to reconcile the
conflict between the individual and the group. The Steele decision
was based on the "principle of general application that the exercise
of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption
toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and
behalf .... ,,2' This decision affected unions in two ways. First,
unions were required to recognize the individual employee's inter-
ests. Before Steele, unions could deny or ignore an employee request
for any or no reason. Steele required fair consideration for all em-
ployee interests by unions. Second, the fair representation duty
placed judicial restraints on unions--dissatisfied employees could
now seek judicial regulation of the manner in which unions repre-
sented employees. Prior to Steele, only political pressure restrained
unions. If the union alienated the membership, it could be ousted
and replaced by a majority vote of the employees.
After Steele the Court extended the scope of the duty beyond a
concern for fairness for a racial minority in a bargaining unit to a
general recognition that federal labor policy cannot sanction dis-
crimination against any employee. This principle, on the basis of the
reasoning developed in the RLA cases, was deemed implicit in the
NLRA in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman.25 The Court restated the fair
representation duty as one of "complete loyalty to the interests of all
whom [the union] represents. ' 26 Nonetheless, Huffman imposed a
far-reaching limitation on the duty. The Court required "[a] wide
range of reasonableness . . . in serving the unit [the union] repre-
sents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose
21. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
22. Id. at 198.
23. Id. at 202-03.
24. Id. at 202.
25. 345 U.S. 330 (1953); see Clark, The Duty ofFair Representation. A Theoretical Struc-
ture, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
26. 345 U.S. at 338.
in the exercise of its discretion."27 In later years this limitation reap-
peared providing a counterbalance to the expanding fair representa-
tion duty.28
In Conley v. Gibson2 9 the Court rejected a contention that the
duty of fair representation extended only to the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement. The Court found that the duty of
fair representation applied to both the negotiation and administra-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, stating that "[tihe bargain-
ing representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out
[the grievance process] than it can in negotiating a collective agree-
ment."3 As a result of Conley, the duty extends to all phases of
labor relations.3 t
Conley also introduced a due process analogy by finding that
"[a] contract may be fair and impartial on its face yet administered
in such a way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be
flagrantly discriminatory against some members of the bargaining
unit. '3 2 This parallels constitutional due process analysis applied to
criminal statutes, which requires that the language of the statute as
well as its enforcement be nondiscriminatory.33 In a labor context
this requires examining actual enforcement and impact to ensure fair
representation in substance as well as form.
In Humphrey v. Moore,34 however, the Court qualified the duty
by emphasizing the importance of giving the union discretion in the
grievance process. Just as a union must be able to refrain from
processing frivolous grievances clogging the process, it must also be
free to take a position on not so frivolous disputes.3 In 1967 the
Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision of Vaca v.
27. Id. In determining whether this duty has been breached, the factfinder must keep the
following in mind:
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the
negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantages as,
in the ight of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of
the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative
advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. . . . The bargaining represen-
tative, whoever it may be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the inter-
ests of all whom it represents. . . . Inevitably differences arise in the manner and
degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them
invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be ex-
pected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining rep-
resentative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
Id. at 337-38.
28. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
29. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
30. Id. at 46.
31. Clark, supra note 25, at 1120.
32. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).
33. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
34. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
35. Id. at 349.
S0 es, 36 which qualified union discretion. The union in Vaca re-
fused to arbitrate an employee's discharge. In its holding, the Court
first restated that an employee does not have "an absolute right to
have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of
the applicable collective bargaining agreement."37 It then ruled that
a union can neither ignore an employee's meritorious grievance nor
process it perfunctorily.38
Vaca recognized the necessity for union flexibility by balancing
this against the employee's need for a remedy from union power
abuse. The Court created a remedy with substance by establishing a
"standard" for measuring union conduct. It ruled, "[a] breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's con-
duct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith. ' 39 This standard broadened the fair
representation duty that had originally been limited to discrimina-
tory and bad faith conduct.
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
40
clarified the Vaca standard. It ruled that the finality of an arbitra-
tor's award is conditioned upon the union satisfying its statutory
duty fairly to represent the employee in arbitration proceedings.4'
The Court emphasized Vaca's broad language and partially clarified
the Vaca standard. Although the Court specifically allowed "mere
errors in judgment," unions are not permitted to leave employees
"without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate
remedy."42
Hines requires less deference for the collective bargaining proc-
ess and more concern for individual employee protection than previ-
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. Id. at 191.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 190.
40. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
41. Id. at 571.
42. Id. In Hines, the Court went on to say,
[Employees] are not entitled to relitigate . . .[claims] . . .merely because they offer
newly discovered evidence that the charges against them were false. . . .The griev-
ance processes cannot be expected to be error-free. The finality provision has suffi-
cient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake. But it is quite another
matter to suggest that erroneous arbitration decisions must stand even though the
employee's representation by the union has been dishonest, in bad faith, or discrimi-
natory; for in that event error and injustice of the grossest sort would multiply. The
contractual system would then cease to qualify as an adequate mechanism to secure
individual redress for damaging failure of the employer to abide by the contract.
Congress has put its blessin& on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in
collective agreements, but it was anticipated ...that the contractual machinery
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity. In our view, enforcement of
the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union's
having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection with
the arbitration proceedings. [Wronged]. . .employees would be left without. . . a
fair opportunity to. secure an adequate remedy.
Id.
ous cases.43 The Court again applied a due process type analysis."
Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity for an
appropriate hearing.45 Similarly, in Hines, the Court found that re-
dress beyond the grievance arbitration procedures was appropriate,
and mandated "an adequate mechanism to secure individual redress
for damaging failure of the employer to abide by the contract.
46
Following the "fundamental fairness" due process concept, the
Court fashioned its rule to prevent "error and injustice of the gross-
est sort."'4'  Hines cast aside the finality of arbitration awards by es-
tablishing a policy of encouraging employee challenges founded on a
failure to be properly represented.48
Although the Court's opinions in the above cases do not pre-
cisely define the union's fair representation duty in the private sector,
they do reject extremes and mark some outer boundaries. These lim-
its are further narrowed, and the standard is given substantive con-
tent, by four principles that appear in the Court's opinions from
Humphrey to Hines.49  First, the legally enforceable contractual
rights that individual employees acquire under collective bargaining
agreements are valuable personal rights, and the union's ability to
prevent employees from enforcing those rights should be limited. 0
Second, arbitration should not be overburdened with frivolous griev-
ances by allowing an individual employee unilaterally to invoke ar-
bitration or to compel the union to take grievances to arbitration
regardless of their merit.5' Third, the union, as statutory agent and
co-author of the collective bargaining agreement, should be able to
isolate and resolve major problem areas in interpreting the agree-
ment.52 Last, there should be assurance that in settling disputes
under collective bargaining agreements similar matters will be
43. Comment, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Fact or Fiction, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 1116, 1126 (1977).
44. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957).
45. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
46. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 574.
49. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 262 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sum-
mers].
50. Id. In the words of the Court in Vaca, "We cannot believe that Congress, in confer-
ring upon employers and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, in-
tended to confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all
remedies for breach of contract." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
51. Summers, supra note 49, at 262. The union must be free to sift out frivolous griev-
ances that clog the grievance process and must have the power to settle the majority of griev-
ances short of the costlier and more time-consuming steps of arbitration. Id.
52. Id. Where bargaining has left ambiguities or gaps in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the union must be able to resolve those ambiguities or fill those gaps by settlement of
grievances with the employer. Id.
treated consistently.53
C The Nature of the Duty
Whatever forum is utilized in the private sector to enforce the
fair representation duty, the problem of defining the scope and na-
ture of the duty is essentially similar. From the decisions, it is now
clear that the duty applies to all collective bargaining phases-both
the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and the process-
ing of grievances.54
The question whether a union has fairly represented an em-
ployee frequently arises in the context of a union's duty to process
grievances. A union is not required to pursue every grievance to ar-
bitration.55 For example, a union may refuse to process further the
grievance of an uncooperative employee who steadfastly neglects,
fails, or refuses to provide either the union or the employer informa-
tion material to a grievance.56 A union may refuse to process a
grievance or handle it in a particular manner for various reasons, but
it may not do so without reason, merely at the whim of someone
exercising union authority. 7 It may not refuse to process a griev-
ance because of lack of union membership by the employee. 8 The
union is not, however, required to investigate thoroughly and ex-
haustively the merits of a grievance when its initial investigation
shows sufficient justification for the employer's actions.5 9 Moreover,
a union may withdraw or refuse to arbitrate a grievance after the
grievant rejects a negotiated settlement without breaching a fair rep-
resentation duty.6' It need not process an employee's grievance if
53. Id. A problem of interpretation, once settled or determined in one case, should final-
ize the problem in all other cases. Individual grievants should not be subject to "the vagaries
of independent and unsystematic negotiation." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
54. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). The Court stated,
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and invidious" distinc-
tions among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end. . . with the making
of an agreement between union and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing
process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and
other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements,
and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract. The bargaining
representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions than
it can in negotiating a collective agreement.
Id. at 46.
55. Crawford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Wyo. 1974);
Lacour v. A.A. Rabalais, Inc., 90 L.R.R.M. 2046, 2048 (E.D. La. 1975).
56. Hicks v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 95 L.R.R.M. 2814 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
57. International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 132, 220 N.L.R.B. 119 (1975).
58. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement deniedon other grounds, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
59. Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hershman v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46 (D. Nev. 1977).
60. Douillette v. Rumford Press, 95 L.R.R.M. 2555 (D. N.H. 1977); Powell v. Globe
Indus., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
the chances for success in arbitration are minimal.6 A union is only
obligated to carry a meritorious grievance to the point at which fur-
ther action would be fruitless.62 The financial impact of the arbitra-
tion cost on the union's treasury may also be considered, although
there is some doubt whether a decision not to arbitrate based solely
on economic considerations would constitute a breach of the duty.63
The duty of fair representation extends even beyond the nego-
tiation of a collective bargaining agreement and the handling of
grievances. In International Association of Ironworkers Local 433
(Associated General Contractors),64 the Board found that the union's
administration of its exclusive hiring hall, including dispatching job
applicants in violation of the agreement and threatening acts of vio-
lence against those who protested, was arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore, a breach of the duty. On the other hand, a union's good
faith refusal to file an unfair labor practice for a discharged em-
ployee, after it unsuccessfully arbitrated his claim, was held not to
violate the duty.65 Finally, as a general rule, mere errors in judg-
ment are insufficient to support a claim for breach of the duty,66 and
a union's good faith representation at an arbitration hearing moots
any earlier alleged unfair representation in the grievance proce-
dure.6 7
The content of the fair representation duty lies within these very
general guidelines. Whether the duty is breached depends on the
context in which the union's action occurred, analyzed in light of the
court and Board standards held applicable to similar circumstances.
D. Negotiation Versus Administration of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement
Section 159(a) of the NLRA distinguishes between the union's
role in negotiating and administering an agreement. 68 Although it
61. See Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971); General Box Co.,
189 N.L.R.B. 269 (1971).
62. Stanley v. General Foods Corp., 508 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. See Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
64. 228 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1977).
65. Lewis v. Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977).
66. Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S.
955 (1977); see also note 42, supra.
67. Crenshaw v. Allied Chemical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Va. 1975).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Section 159(a) provides,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining rep-
resentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective
vests the majority union with exclusive authority to negotiate an
agreement,69 it does not grant the union exclusive authority in
presenting and settling grievances.7" Thus, the employer must deal
exclusively with the union in making an agreement, but may adjust
grievances with individual employees if that adjustment is not "in-
consistent with the terms" of the collective bargaining agreement,
and the union is given an "opportunity to be present at such adjust-
ment."7 1
Typically unions assert the exclusive power to process, settle,
and take grievances to arbitration, which removes the effect of Sec-
tion 159(a). 72 Hence, employers grant by contract what Congress re-
fused to give unions by statute.73 When, however, the union obtains
exclusive control over the grievance procedure through collective
bargaining, a special responsibility to exercise control on behalf of
the individual grievant's interest is imposed. The union, having de-
prived individual employees of the ability to enforce their rights
under the collective bargaining agreement, becomes subject to suits
for breach of the duty of fair representation in processing grievances.
A distinction must be drawn regarding the nature of the duty of
fair representation depending upon whether negotiation or adminis-
tration of the collective bargaining agreement is involved. The
union's need for flexibility in negotiating collective bargaining agree-
ments is of a different dimension than its need for flexibility in inter-
preting and applying the agreement. In negotiating an agreement,
the union must accommodate the overlapping and competing de-
mands of varied interest groups, surrendering or compromising some
demands to achieve others.74 The final agreement represents not
only a bilateral compromise between the union and employer, but
also a multilateral compromise among interest groups within the
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
69. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). For a historical study of the majority
rule principle in law and practice, see Schreiber, The Origins of Majority Rule and Simultaneous
Development of Institutions to Protect the Minority A Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 237 (1971); Weyand, MaJority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 556 (1945).
70. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). For the legislative develop-
ment of this proviso, see Dunau, Employee Particpation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (1950); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agree-
ments and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1972).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
72. See Feller, 4 General Theory ofthe Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Feller].
73. Summers, supra note 49, at 256. Professor Cox has argued that Congress did not
intend that the individual should have a "right" to present grievances, but only that the em-
ployer should have a "privilege" to listen. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 601 (1956). He argued that the individual's right was to fair representation in the griev-
ance procedure, the position adopted by the Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
74. Summers, supra note 49, at 257.
union." To negotiate such an agreement, the union needs a "wide
range of reasonableness."76
In contrast, dispute settlement regarding the meaning and appli-
cation of the collective bargaining agreement requires a much nar-
rower range of union flexibility. If the meaning is clear, all that is
required is to carry out the compromise. 77 Nevertheless, if the agree-
ment is ambiguous, the parties need flexibility to complete the com-
promise.78
These differences between negotiation and administration re-
quire different standards for measuring the fair representation
duty.79 When a union negotiates it is acting like a legislature estab-
lishing rules. Like a legislature, the union is allowed a wide range of
reasonableness. On the other hand, when a union administers an
agreement it acts similar to an administrative agency enforcing and
applying legislation. Here it must act within the boundaries of estab-
lished rules. The fair representation duty in the administration of
the agreement requires enforcement and application or observance
and protection of rights already created by the agreement.8"
The general principles outlined above provide analogs and
bench marks for evaluating fair representation problems under
Pennsylvania's public sector bargaining statutes. An examination of
Pennsylvania's public sector labor relations reveals that the sub-
stance of the fair representation duty is substantially the same,
though some differences exist.
III. The Duty of Fair Representation in Pennsylvania's Public
Sector
In 1968, the Pennsylvania legislature afforded policemen and
firemen the right to organize and bargain collectively in Act 111.81
Act 195,82 passed in 1970, permitted comprehensive collective bar-
gaining by all other public employees.
It would be anomalous to suggest that the private sector's ra-
tionale for the fair representation duty is inappropriate for the public
sector. Public sector employees, however, are not governed by the
provisions of the NLRA that provide a foundation for the duty.
8 3
75. Id.
76. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1952).




81. The Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. 237, No. Ill (Act 111), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 217.1-. 10 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
82. The Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. 563, No. 195 (Act 195), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
1101.101-.2304 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (term "employer" as used in the statute does not in-
clude a state or political subdivision thereof); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, PA. STAT.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania's labor relations statutes are sufficiently
similar to the NLRA to guarantee public employees the right to fair
representation from their unions, and the Pennsylvania courts and
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) decisions recognize a
duty of fair representation in Pennsylvania's public sector labor rela-
tions.84
A. The Statutory Basisfor a Fair Representation Duty
1. The Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195).-Because Act
19585 is patterned after the NLRA, much of its language is similar,
and hence, private sector precedent provides some guidance in con-
struing Act 195. Yet, significant differences exist between the two,
and private sector precedent is not controlling.86
The most significant distinction for purposes of enforcing the
duty of fair representation arises out of the different jurisdictional
bases in the NLRA and Act 195. In the private sector, fair represen-
tation claims can be litigated in either the courts or before the
NLRB. Under Act 195, the duty of fair representation arises solely
from the unfair labor practice sections of the Act, and, therefore, is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board. 7
Act 195 contains no provision paralleling section 301 of the
LMRA. The NLRB was not granted exclusive jurisdiction over fair
representation claims because the NLRB's General Counsel has un-
reviewable discretion in choosing to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint88 and there was no assurance that aggrieved employees
would obtain review of their complaints.8 9 In contrast to the private
sector law, Section 1101.1502 of Act 195 provides for judicial review
ANN. tit. 43, § 211.3(c) (Purdon 1964) (term "employer" as used in the statute does not include
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a political subdivision thereof).
84. McCluskey v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d
45 (1978) (dictum); Robinson v. Abington Educ. Ass'n, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 379 A.2d 1371
(1977); Shannon v. PLRB, 7 P.P.E.R. 246 (Allegheny C.P. 1975); Eastern Lancaster County
School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9192 (PLRB 1978); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dept. of
Transp.), 9 P.P.E.R. 9088 (PLRB 1978); Phoenixville Area School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 351
(PLRB 1977); Clairton School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 243 (PLRB 1977); Hershey Educ. Ass'n, 8
P.P.E.R. 202 (PLRB 1977); Reading School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 174 (PLRB 1976); Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 7 P.P.E.R. 38 (PLRB 1976); Teamsters Local 161, 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB
1975); Philadelphia Community College, 5 P.P.E.R. 105 (PLRB 1974); Scranton School Bd., 3
P.P.E.R. 241 (PLRB 1973), rev'd, 4 P.P.E.R. 61 (PLRB 1974); Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers,
3 P.P.E.R. 226 (PLRB 1973); City of Easton, 3 P.P.E.R. 3 (PLRB 1973); Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., I P.P.E.R. 71 (PLRB 1971).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
86. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
87. See, e.g., Robinson v. Abington Educ. Ass'n, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 379 A.2d 1371
(1977).
88. See, e.g., Comment, Unreviewability ofGeneral Counsel's Discretion: ProposedAmend-
ments for a Private Cause ofAction/or Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 82 DIcK. L. REV. 409
(1978).
89. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1967).
of all final PLRB orders, including orders refusing to issue a com-
plaint.90
Like private sector labor law in which the unfair labor practices
of the NLRA are given meaning concerning the duty of fair repre-
sentation by section 159(a), 9 ' the unfair labor practices provisions of
Act 195 derive their content from section 1101.606.92 Because the
unfair labor practice section of Act 195 closely parallels the statutory
content of the NLRA, Act 195 implicitly guarantees Pennsylvania's
public sector employees the right to be free from unfair and invidi-
ous treatment by their collective bargaining representative in matters
affecting employment.13 The foundation for a duty of fair represen-
tation in Pennsylvania's public sector labor relations is firmly
grounded in Act 195.
2. Judicial and PLRB Authority Supporting the Existence of the
Duty.-The courts and the PLRB have clearly acknowledged the
existence of the fair representation duty in the public sector. 94 Nev-
ertheless, the perimeters of the duty are not yet fully developed by
sufficient court or PLRB case law. Judicially, the duty was first rec-
ognized in Robinson v. Abington Education Association,95 an appeal
by a group of employees alleging that the union unfairly bargained
away various salary premiums. The Commonwealth Court deter-
mined that public sector unions are obliged in bargaining to repre-
sent all employees in good faith without discriminating. Failure to
perform this duty constitutes bad faith bargaining and an unfair la-
bor practice within the PLRB's, not a court's, exclusive jurisdiction.
Robinson thus acknowledges the PLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to
remedy breaches of a union's fair representation duty through the
unfair labor practices section of Act 195.96
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1502 (Purdon 1970). This specific statute was repealed
in 1978 and is now codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 763, 933, 1722(a)(1), 5105, & 5571
(Purdon 1978). Nevertheless, the general proposition--the availibility of judicial review-is
still true, although the different types of review, depending on what is being appealed, are
codified at various places. See also Pennsylvania Social Services Union, Local 668 v. PLRB,
27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 552, 367 A.2d 778 (1976).
91. See notes 11-18, 68-73, and accompanying text supra.
92. Id. § 1101.606. This Section provides,
Representatives selected by public employes in a unit appropriate for collective bar-
gaining purposes shall be the exclusive representative of all the employes in such unit
to bargain on wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employe or a group of employes shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have them adjusted without the intervention of
the bargaining representative as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective bargaining contract then in effect. And, provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given an opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
93. See Teamsters Local 161, 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB 1975).
94. See note 84 supra.
95. 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 379 A.2d 1371 (1977). See also Shannon v. PLRB, 7
P.P.E.R. 246 (C.P. Allegheny 1975).
96. 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 379 A.2d 1371 (1977). In Hollinger v. Department of Pub.
The PLRB first alluded to the existence of the fair representa-
tion duty in Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoriy.97
Here the union failed to process a grievance to arbitration after in-
ternal review by a union committee. In that case, the complaint
charged only the employer and not the union with an unfair labor
practice. The PLRB dismissed the charge, finding that a union's fail-
ure to arbitrate a grievance does not make an employer guilty of an
unfair labor practice when the employer, in good faith, denied the
grievance. 98 Nevertheless, the PLRB indicated that a union's rea-
sons or lack of reasons for not arbitrating a grievance might consti-
tute an unfair labor practice. 99
In Teamsters Local 161, 1° a case involving a union's failure to
arbitrate a grievance, the PLRB explicitly mentioned the existence of
a duty of fair representation under Act 195. The PLRB held that a
union could exercise discretion in handling grievances,' 01 but none-
theless, had an obligation fairly to represent all employees in the
bargaining unit. Restated, the bargaining unit members had the
right to be free from unfair or invidious treatment by their bargain-
ing representative. 1 2
Viewed in the abstract, the union's duty, among other things,
involves the following: (1) a broad discretion in negotiating collec-
tive bargaining agreements; 103 (2) informing an employee of his con-
tractual right of appeal from an employer's decision;" (3)
representing nonunion members in the grievance arbitration proc-
ess;105 and (4) not charging nonunion members for processing or ar-
bitrating grievances. 06 Nevertheless, a union is not required to (1)
provide assistance in matters not covered by the collective bargain-
ing agreement, 10 7 (2) process a grievance if not requested, 1 8 or (3)
arbitrate when an arbitration award exists precluding the claim. 10 9
The area in which a union is most likely to breach its duty of
fair representation is in refusing to process or arbitrate an individual
Welfare, 469 Pa. 358, 366, 365 A.2d 1245, 1249 (1976) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that "if a party directly seeks redress of conduct which arguaby constitutes [an] unfair labor
practice. . . . jurisdiction to determine whether an unfair labor practice has indeed occurred
. . . is in the PLRB, and nowhere else." (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
97. 1 P.P.E.R. 71 (PLRB 1971).
98. Id.
99. Id See also City of Easton, 3 P.P.E.R. 3 (PLRB 1973), in which the union inquired
into the reasons for a personnel action.
100. 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB 1975).
101. Id. at 258. The PLRB cited Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), with approval. Id.
102. See note 84 supra.
103. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 3 P.P.E.R. 226 (PLRB 1973).
104. Shannon v. PLRB, 7 P.P.E.R. 246 (C.P. Allegheny 1975).
105. Philadelphia Community College, 5 P.P.E.R. 105 (PLRB 1974).
106. Phoenixville Area School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB 1977).
107. Hershey Educ. Ass'n, 8 P.P.E.R. 202 (PLRB 1977).
108. Scranton School Bd., 3 P.P.E.R. 241 (PLRB 1973), rev'd, 4 P.P.E.R. 61 (PLRB 1974).
109. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dept. of Trans.), 9 P.P.E.R. 9088 (PLRB 1978).
employee's grievance. In refusing to process or arbitrate a grievance,
a union must utilize various safeguards to insure fair representation.
Among these safeguards a union should do the following: (1) investi-
gate the grievance before making a decision regarding its merits; 0
(2) consult with their attorney for a review of the record and evi-
dence;.. and (3) review the decision not to pursue a grievance
before an internal union staff committee." 2 It should be noted, how-
ever, that any one of the above precautions may not be sufficient to
satisfy the union's duty. A combination may be necessary depending
upon the facts of the particular case.
Within Pennsylvania's public sector, the ratification of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and nonunion members' rights pose inter-
esting questions for the union's fair representation duty. Nonunion
members are not permitted to vote on ratification if disallowed by
the union's constitution.I 'I A union may statutorily limit voting to
union members without violating Act 195.114 The PLRB construes
this as meaning that unions can and should restrict ratification of a
collective bargaining agreement to union members.' Therefore, a
union does not breach its fair representation duty by restricting rati-
fication to union members. Other types of votes, however, may re-
quire the participation of nonunion members, and nonunion
members may still be entitled to vote on other matters directly affect-
ing working conditions. For example, after ratification of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the employees may retain the right to
vote on the bargaining unit's days-off schedule."
6
Generally speaking, it can be asserted that the Pennsylvania
courts and the PLRB apply the substantive content of the fair repre-
sentation duty developed in the private sector, and a public sector
union is obliged to represent employees in a manner that is not arbi-
trary, unreasonable, discriminatory, fraudulent, or lacking good
110. City of Easton, 3 P.P.E.R. 3 (PLRB 1973).
111. Teamsters Local 61, 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB 1975).
112. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 7 P.P.E.R. 38 (PLRB 1976); Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., I P.P.E.R. 71 (PLRB 1971).
113. Eastern Lancaster County School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9192 (PLRB 1978); Clairton
School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 243 (PLRB 1977); Reading School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 174 (PLRB 1976).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.902 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Section 1101.902 expressly
permits this:
If the provisions of the constitution or bylaws of an employe organization requires
ratification of a collective bargaining agreement by its membership, only those mem-
bers who belong to the bargaining unit involved shall be entitled to vote on such
ratification notwithstanding such provisions.
115. Reading School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 174, 176 (PLRB 1976). In Eastern Lancaster
County School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9192 at 390 (PLRB 1978), the PLRB found support for this
rationale within the private sector. The NLRB has ruled that ratification of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is an integral part of the union's representation process, and, thus, an inter-
nal union matter properly determinable by union members alone. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 232 N.L.R.B. 263 (1977).
116. See authorities cited in note 115 supra.
faith. ' 17
3. Collective Bargaining by Policemen and Firemen's Act (Act
111).-In sharp contrast to Act 195,' 18 the Collective Bargaining by
Policemen and Firemen's Act (Act 11 )1 9 lacks many features of a
viable labor relations statute. It fails to provide procedures for con-
ducting representation elections' 20 or processing unfair labor prac-
tices. Moreover, Act 111 contains little, if any, language paralleling
the NLRA or Act 195.12' Nevertheless, Act 111 is not completely
devoid of statutory support for the union's fair representation duty.
Section 217.1 states that policemen or firemen "shall, through labor
organizations or other representatives. . . have the right to bargain
collectively . . . and shall have the right to an adjustment or settle-
ment of their grievances .. ,22 This language partially approxi-
mates that contained in Section 159(a)123 of the NLRA and Section
1101.606 of Act 195,124 which has been found appropriate under
both the NLRA' 25 and Act 195126 to support the existence of a duty
of fair representation. Problems arise, however, concerning the
duty's enforcement; namely, whether the courts or the PLRB are to
exercise jurisdiction. Act 111 does not give the courts explicit juris-
diction to hear such claims through a provision similar to Section
301 of the LMRA.'27 Although it lacks a provision explicitly provid-
ing PLRB jurisdiction or an unfair labor practices section through
which the PLRB could enforce the duty, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's recent decision in Philadelphia Fire Officers Association v.
PLRB'28 may provide a basis for PLRB jurisdiction over breach of
fair representation claims.
Philadelphia Fire Officers Association determined that Act 111
must be read inpari materia129 with the Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
117. McCluskey v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d
45 (1978); Robinson v. Abington Educ. Ass'n, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 379 A.2d 1371 (1977);
Shannon v. PLRB, 7 P.P.E.R. 246 (1975) (C.P. Allegheny 1975); Phoenixville Area School
Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB 1977); Teamsters Local 161, 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB 1975).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, f§ 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
120. See Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977)
(Supreme Court noted deficiency of Act 1II in the representation area).
121. Act III contains no language paralleling §§ 157-159 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157-59 (1976). It also contains no language paralleling §§ 1101.401, 1101.606, or 1101.1201
of Act 195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.401, 1101.606, 1101.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 217.1 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
125. See notes 6-18 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
128. 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977).
129. In pari materia is a technique of statutory interpretation meaning that ambiguous
legislative intent may sometimes be gathered from other statutes dealing with the same subject
tions Act of 1937 (PLRA) 3 ° regarding the PLRB's jurisdiction over
police and firemen representation elections. The court, however, did
not address the extent of the PLRB's jurisdiction in other matters,
and how much of the PLRA is to be considered inpari materia with
Act 11113t remains unresolved. Depending upon the extent of this
jurisdiction, a fair representation duty may be founded on an Act
111 and PLRA in pari materia interpretation.
The PLRB found that the unfair labor practices provisions of
the PLRA could be read inpari materia with Act 111 in City of Eas-
ton. ' 32 Consequently, the union's fair representation duty may exist
if Section 217.1 of Act 111133 can be read in pari materia with Sec-
tions 211.5, 211.6 and 211.7(a) of the PLRA. t34 These PLRA sec-
tions are similar to Sections 157, 158, and 159 of the NLRA 35 and
Sections 1101.401, 1101.606, and 1101.1201 of Act 195.136 The
matter. See generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.01-.08
(4th ed. 1973).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.39 (Purdon 1964 & Purdon Supp. 1979). This Act
provided private sector employees with collective bargaining rights and created the Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB). See id. at § 211.4.
131. See Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Police and Firemen, 16 DUQ. L. REV.
185 (1978).
132. City of Easton, 9 P.P.E.R. 9109 (PLRB 1978).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Purdon Supp. 1979). This Section provides in perti-
nent part that policemen or firemen "shall, through labor organizations or other representa-
tives. . . , have the right to bargain collectively ... and shall have the right to an adjustment
or settlement of their grievances .. " See notes 122-26 and accompanying text supra.
134. Id. at §§ 211.5, 211.6, 211.7(a). Section 211.5 provides that
Employes shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Id. Section 211.6(1) provides in pertinent part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employes in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in this act.
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization ....
Section 211.6(2)(a) provides in pertinent part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization, or any officer or officers of a labor organization, or any agent or agents of a
labor organization, or any one acting in the interest of a labor organization, or for an employee
or for employees acting in concert:
(a) To intimidate, restrain, or coerce an employe for the purpose and with the intent
of compelling such employe to join or to refrain from joining any labor organization,
or for the purpose or with the intent of influencing or affecting his selection of repre-
sentatives for the purposes of collective bargaining.
In turn, Section 211.7(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employes in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employes in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employe or a group of
employes shalf have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 159(a) (1976).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.401, 1101.606, 1101.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
PLRA, 137 however, lacks the detailed listing of "union" or "em-
ployee organization" unfair labor practices found in the NLRA'
38
and Act 195.139 This may weaken the existence of a fair representa-
tion duty under Act 111 since only Section 211.6(2)(a) conceivably
applies. '
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As yet, neither the court nor the PLRB have applied a fair rep-
resentation duty under Act 111. Notwithstanding the absence of per-
suasive court or PLRB authority, the duty may nevertheless be
justified for police and firemen by Act Ill alone or through reading
it in pari materia with the PLRA. If the duty exists, its standard
should be similar to that applied under Act 195 because there is no
rational basis for distinguishing between policemen and firemen on
one hand, and all other public employees on the other regarding the
right to be free from arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory con-
duct by a collective bargaining representative.
B. Some Emerging Principles
As public sector labor law continues to mature, more attention
necessarily will be focused on relationships between public employ-
ees and their unions. Clearly, arbitrary conduct by the union can
deprive an employee of statutorily granted and collectively bar-
gained rights as effectively as conduct by the public employer. It is
thus useful to outline and discuss some of the areas that will confront
public employers, employees, and unions as current case law princi-
ples expand to deal with new situations.
1. Quality of Union Representation.-Essentially, the fair rep-
resentation duty is based on the proposition that unions exercise
power on employees' behalf and owe a fiduciary duty to the employ-
ees in protecting their interests.' 4 ' The union, as fiduciary, is en-
trusted with enforcing employee rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. It cannot arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner.
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The quality of a union's representation may depend, among
other things, upon the adequacy of the investigation or presentation
of grievances. Unions owe a duty to use "reasonable care" in inves-
tigating and processing grievances. To settle, withdraw, fail to file,
or process a grievance to arbitration without making reasonable ef-
forts to investigate it constitutes perfunctory handling. Requiring
137. See id. at § 211.6(2).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
140. Id. at § 21 1.6(2)(a). See note 134 supra for text of this section.
141. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
142. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
unions to use "reasonable care" in filing, investigating, and process-
ing grievances thus involves substantial responsibility on their part.
Because of the special relationship between the union and employ-
ees, however, the duty of reasonable care that a fiduciary owes to
individuals should be imposed. 
14 3
A union's failure to exercise reasonable care in grievance
processing should be considered a violation of the fair representation
duty' for two reasons. First, the union has voluntarily assumed, if
not aggressively sought, the authority to represent the employees. 1
45
It expands its statutory representative authority by negotiating con-
tractual provisions providing it with exclusive control over griev-
ances, which bars employees from processing their own grievances.
Having established control over the employee's contractual rights,
unions should exercise the duty of reasonable care in enforcing those
rights. 146 Second, the public employer, by giving the union exclusive
control over grievances, becomes insulated from employee suits un-
less the union violates the fair representation duty. A public em-
ployer who wrongfully discharges an employee, however, should not
escape liability because of the union's negligence. This would leave
the employee a victim of two wrongs without a remedy for either.1
47
At a minimum, unions should be required to properly explain
and justify refusals to process or arbitrate grievances. This "proper
justification" might include finding a grievance petty or frivolous,
too costly, not contractual in nature or likely to result in an unfavor-
able contract interpretation if arbitrated. If unions agree to process
grievances, they should be required to represent employees fairly.
They should not be permitted to go through the motions when the
real objective is to "throw" grievances.
Finally, the quality of fair representation can be greatly im-
proved by training union representatives in techniques of investigat-
ing and preparing grievances, which training may eliminate errors
involving carelessness or lack of diligence. In addition to training its
representatives, unions can satisfy a reasonable care duty by investi-
gating grievances before making a decision regarding their merits,
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consulting with their attorney for a review of the record and evi-
143. "Reasonable care" varies according to the relationships, if any, existing between the
parties. The traditional reasonable care tort duty is essentially negative in character because it
is breached only through affirmative misconduct-"misfeasance." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971). The fiduciary nature of the union/employee relationship imposes
an affirmative duty of reasonable care in the investigation and processing of grievances; and
nonfeasance, such as failure adequately to investigate a grievance, may constitute a breach of
this duty.
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dence, ' 49 and reviewing the decision not to pursue a grievance before
an internal union staff committee.1 51 Of course, any of the above
may not alone satisfy this duty. A combination may be required to
meet a reasonable care duty depending upon the facts associated
with the alleged fair representation breach.
2. Public Employer Liability.-Public employers may and
probably should be joined with unions in fair representation cases if
the public employer caused arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith
conduct by the union. Similarly, when the public employer is impli-
cated in the union's alleged discriminatory action, joinder should oc-
cur.' 5 ' If the employer is liable, damages should be apportioned
between the employer and union according to their respective
fault. 152
A problem arises in calculating who caused what damages.'53
The public employer may attempt to protect itself from liability by
ignoring union representatives and dealing with employees directly
when it suspects arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith union con-
duct. Such action, however, would have a detrimental effect on la-
bor relations and result in the public employer committing unfair
labor practices to protect against liability,' a clearly undesirable
result. Nevertheless, damages attributable to.the public employer
should not be charged to the union and damages caused by the
union should not be assessed against the public employer. Each
must only be accountable for their proportion of the damages, if any.
Consequently, if employees can sustain an unfair labor practice
charge against a public employer and a breach of the union's fair
representation duty tainting an arbitrator's award, recovery should
be permitted against both the employer and the union.'55 If the
union breaches its duty, the employee should be entitled to a rehear-
ing by the same or another arbitrator, or if there is no rehearing, the
union should be liable for damages from the date of the original
action to the current date. If a rehearing is granted and the arbitra-
tor reverses the original award, damages against the employer
should be measured to the date of the original award, and the union
149. See Teamsters Local 161, 6 P.P.E.R. 257 (PLRB 1975).
150. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 7 P.P.E.R. 38 (PLRB 1976); Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., I P.P.E.R. 71 (PLRB 1971).
151. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967) (private sector employers). See also Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
152. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
153. See St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969). The
PLRB never addressed the problem in Phoenixville Area School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB
1977), and apparently, it was left to the arbitrator to apportion damages.
154. For a discussion of this concern in a private sector case, see Carroll v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
155. See note 151 smpra.
should be responsible for damages from the date of the original
award to the implementation date of the new award.
If the public employer is solely liable, the employee should re-
ceive a rehearing by the same or another arbitrator. And if the arbi-
trator reverses the original award, the employee should receive
damages from the date of the original action to the implementation
date of the new award. If, however, no rehearing is granted, the
public employer should be liable for damages from the date of the
original action to the current date.
Finally, if both the public employer and union are liable, the
employee again should be entitled to a rehearing by the same or an-
other arbitrator. If no rehearing is granted, damages should be di-
vided equally between the parties from the date of the original action
to the current date. If a rehearing is granted and the arbitrator
reverses the original award, the employee should receive damages
divided equally between the parties from the date of the original ac-
tion to the implementation date of the new award.
The foregoing suggestions will not undermine the finality ac-
corded arbitration awards and the collective bargaining process. To
prevail against either the public employer or union, the employee
must not only show that the employer's action violated the labor
agreement, but must also carry the burden of demonstrating the
union's breach of a duty owed the employee. This involves more
than demonstrating mere errors in judgment. The grievance process
cannot be expected to be errorless, and the finality provision has suf-
ficient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake. 56 It is an-
other matter, however, to suggest that erroneous arbitration
decisions must stand even though the union's representation has
been arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. If they were allowed
to stand, the contractual and statutory arbitration system would
cease to be an adequate mechanism securing individual redress for
failure of public employers and unions to adhere to the collective
bargaining agreement. Although the Pennsylvania legislature favors
private dispute settlement arrangements in collective bargaining
agreements in the public sector, 157 the legislature anticipated that the
contractual and statutorily mandated grievance arbitration machin-
ery would operate with a minimum level of integrity.
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Proof of the union's breaching its fair representation duty
156. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 572 (1976). See note 42 supra.
157. Act 195 statutorily requires a contractual arbitration provision to be included in a
public sector collective bargaining agreement. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon
Supp. 1979).
158. See Donnellan v. Mt. Lebanon School Dist., 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 33, 377 A.2d 1054
(1977).
removes the finality bar from an arbitration award.'5 9 Nevertheless,
this does not automatically render the public employer liable. If a
public employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitration
award, then failure to comply with employees' requests cannot be
objectionable until a contrary determination occurs.' 6 ° Public em-
ployers can be held liable only if the employees can sustain a cause
of action, which may be separate from or in combination with an
action against the union.
3. Horsetrading Grievances.-"Grievance horsetrading" in-
volves trading or exchanging one grievance for another by the union
and the employer, usually to remove an overload on the grievance
resolution mechanism or to avoid the expense of arbitration. This
practice is premised upon an assumption that the union owns the
grievance. Under the collective bargaining agreement, however, an
employee acquires legal rights, and the union is merely the em-
ployee's agent for enforcing those rights.16  If the union evaluates
each withdrawn grievance and determines they lacked sufficient
merit, then no serious fairness problem occurs because the union's
action serves to "sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would
only clog the grievance process,"' 62 and hence, serves a legitimate
purpose. Employees whose grievances are disposed of in this man-
ner have no cause of action because the union is trading grievances it
would not have processed further.' 63 Often, however, grievance
trading is done in bulk, without sufficiently investigating or evaluat-
ing the merits of the individual grievances."64 Grievance settlements
are discriminatory when individual employee's grievances are
treated differently than others when there is no rational basis for the
distinction, and when certain employees' rights are abandoned to
benefit others. The union should not escape its responsibility to in-
vestigate and evaluate grievances, or seek settlements, on the merits
or lack of merit of the grievances. At the same time, the public em-
159. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348-
51 (1964).
160. A public employer's noncompliance with an arbitration award would constitute an
unfair labor practice under Act 195. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(8) (Purdon
Supp. 1979). An analogous problem arises when the union breaches its duty of fair representa-
tion by refusing to process an employee's grievance. The PLRB, without articulating its ra-
tionale, held a public employer guilty of a section 1101.1201(a)(5) unfair labor practice for
refusing to arbitrate the grievance, even though under the collective bargaining agreement the
grievance was untimely because of the union's delay. See Phoenixville Area School Dist., 8
P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB 1977). In that case, the public employer was merely asserting a good faith
contractual defense to the grievance, and was not aware of the union's breach.
161. Summers, supra note 49, at 270.
162. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964).
163. Summers, supra note 49, at 271.
164. Id.
ployer should not escape liability in agreeing to grievance settle-
ments when the union breaches its duty of fair representation.
4. The Union's Right to Control Arbitration Access.-In Act
195, the Legislature drew a definite line between the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements. The Legislature
explicitly decided that unions needed exclusive power to negotiate
agreements but did not need exclusive power to settle grievances.
Indeed, Section 1101.606 indicates a legislative policy that unions
should not have exclusive control over grievances: "any individual
employe or a group of employes shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer and to have them adjusted with-
out the intervention of the bargaining representative ... 165
Despite this proviso of section 1101.606, under most collective
bargaining agreements, unions assert the exclusive power to process,
settle, and arbitrate grievances. 66 This power, however, does not de-
rive from Act 195 but from the collective bargaining agreement. Act
195 mandates the inclusion of a grievance arbitration procedure in a
collective bargaining agreement but leaves its content, scope, and
specifics to the parties' negotiations. 167 Consequently, the union's
exclusive control over the grievance arbitration procedure in the
agreement is granted by the public employer, not by the Legislature;
i.e., public employers, by contract, have given unions the status the
Legislature refused to grant by statute. By virtue of this contractu-
ally derived status as exclusive enforcers of the grievance arbitration
process, unions assume a heavy responsibility to exercise control on
behalf of, rather than against, employees.
5. The Right to Union Representation and the Union's Fair Rep-
resentation Duty.-Because the right to union representation exists
in Pennsylvania's public sector, unions must be cognizant of their
responsibility to provide representation when requested by an em-
ployee.'68 The right involves union representation at investigatory
interviews when an employee may be disciplined by the employer. 1
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If the employee requests representation, the union cannot act arbi-
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Once a grievance is arbi-
trated, only the union has standing to appeal the arbitrator's decision to the courts. McClus-
key v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d 45 (1978).
166. See, e.g., id. See also 2 COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) 55:1-21
(1978). Professor Feller argues that this exclusive control is an essential aspect of the collective
bargaining agreement. Feller, supra note 72, at 663. See also notes 68-69. and accompanying
text supra.
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
168. For a discussion of this right in Pennsylvania's public sector see Decker, Public Sector
Union Representation Rights at Investigatory Interviews in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV. 655
(1978). See also Conneaut School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 10092 (PLRB 1979).
169. Id See also NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
trarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in providing or refusing to
provide representation at the investigatory interview. This represen-
tation applies to both nonmembers and union members. A blanket
refusal to accompany or assist an employee at an investigatory inter-
view breaches the union's duty.
6. Exhausting Internal Union Mechanisms.-Prior to charging
a union with a breach of its fair representation duty, the employee
should be required to exhaust internal union remedies. 70 Unions
should be required to have within their constitutions a mechanism
by which nonmembers and members can redress fair representation
complaints. This might be similar to a grievance arbitration proce-
dure whereby the complaint is finally resolved by an impartial arbi-
trator. Such a device provides an effective alternative forum for
employees who desire to assert fair representation claims.
Indeed, within the private sector, when internal union redress
procedures exist, employees must exhaust those procedures before
suing in other forums.' 7 ' Failure to exhaust union procedures is
considered a valid union defense to a fair representation claim. On
the other hand, even courts recognizing the defense have held it ab-
rogated when there are no such internal union procedures to ex-
haust, or attempts to exhaust available procedures would be futile
because of the union's actions.'
72
Another possible recourse is for the parties to provide for arbi-
tration of fair representation claims in their collective bargaining
agreement. Under this procedure, claims could be asserted against
the union, the public employer, or both. Exhaustion would be re-
quired before an employee could file a claim in another forum. Of
course, this arbitration would be limited to the employee's fair repre-
sentation claim, and would not be a relitigation of the merits of the
employee's grievance against the public employer. Moreover, the
employee should still bear the burden of proving bad faith or arbi-
trary conduct in the union's handling of the grievance, or collusion
between the union and the employer in violation of the employee's
rights.
IV. Conclusion
The duty of fair representation is well established in the private
170. For a discussion of these internal union procedures in the private sector see Klein,
Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: Alternative Forums, in THE DuTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION 97 (McKelvey ed. 1977).
171. See, e.g., Ditzler v. International Ass'n of Machinists Local 1984, 453 F. Supp. 50
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973).
172. Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Or-
phan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
sector. Under Pennsylvania's public sector collective bargaining
laws, the duty, although recognized, is still in an embryonic stage of
development. Significant issues will arise regarding the proper
method of apportioning liability between the public employer and
the union when the duty is breached. Some fundamental principles,
however, have already emerged. Foremost among these are the fol-
lowing:
1. Individuals acquire legally enforceable rights under a
collective bargaining agreement, and the union's power
to prevent enforcement of those rights should be lim-
ited;
2. Arbitration should not be overburdened with frivolous
grievances by allowing employees unilaterally to invoke
arbitration or by compelling unions to arbitrate merit-
less grievances; and
3. In settling disputes under the collective bargaining
agreement similar complaints should be treated consist-
ently.
Further litigation will refine the application of these principles
as the courts and PLRB seek to accommodate the employee's right to
fairness of representation with the union's need for flexibility and
substantial freedom in negotiating and administering a collective
bargaining agreement.
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